Abstract

In the ever-evolving blockchain ecosystem, decentralized exchanges (DEXs) have seen significant growth, which, however, also brought challenges of Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). Unlike centralized exchanges, DEXs offer a decentralized platform for cryptocurrency trading. Such trading mechanisms primarily include Constant Function Market Makers (CFMMs) and batch auctions. This paper delves into the optimal MEV strategies across these two DEX frameworks. As our first result, we show it is NP-hard to compute an optimal strategy in any CFMMs, when the fraction of swap fee is any constant larger than zero (e.g., 0.3% being commonly used in Uniswap pools).

The second part of our paper examines DEXs utilizing batch auctions, which have gained a lot of attention for their appealing properties. By treating tokens and transactions as goods and traders within a pure exchange market, batch auctions can be formulated as a linear market, allowing exchange rates and trading outcomes in a batch to be derived from the prices and allocation in its market equilibrium. This design ensures fairness and efficiency from the perspective of economics. Despite the general belief that batch auctions are less vulnerable to MEV due to uniform pricing and order independence of transactions, we highlight that the block builder’s current ability to rearrange the batch is certainly sufficient to extract MEV in batch auctions, where the strategic behavior is a novel market equilibrium manipulation. We further explore the computation and show that: When the transactions in a batch form a Fisher market, an optimal attack can be computed in polynomial time; When the transactions form a general Arrow-Debreu market, it is NP-hard to find such one.

Our results present a complete picture of the complexity of optimizing MEV in DEXs, contributing valuable insights to the ongoing discourse on DEX security and the solutions for addressing MEV therein.

Keywords: Decentralized Exchanges, Maximal Extractable Value, Batch Auctions, Market Equilibrium

*Majority of the work was done when the author was at New York University.
1 Introduction

Within the evolving landscape of blockchain technology, the decentralized finance (DeFi) space has witnessed unprecedented growth, with various financial services available on-chain. As the cornerstone of the DeFi movement, Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs) mark a significant shift in the paradigm of asset exchange within the blockchain ecosystem. Leveraging smart contracts on the blockchain, DEXs offer a peer-to-peer marketplace for users to trade cryptocurrencies (also known as tokens) without the intermediation of a central authority, which is aligned with the ethos of decentralization. Nowadays, the daily volume of DEXs has reached billions of US dollars [1].

Automated Market Makers (AMMs) are the most widely used type of DEXs. It replaces traditional order books with liquidity pools, each of which is composed of tokens of trading pairs and managed by an on-chain smart contract. In AMMs, users directly swap their tokens against the pool without waiting for a matching order. The exchange rate is algorithmically determined based on the reserves of tokens in the liquidity pool. The most commonly used are constant functions, such as the constant product formula in Uniswap [2], which requires the product of token reserves in the pool to remain constant before and after a trade. Thus, these AMMs are also known as constant function market makers (CFMMs). To avoid unexpected slippage, users are encouraged to set a slippage tolerance, which is equivalent to a limit/threshold of the exchange rate below which their transactions should fail. During a trade, a small fraction (say, 0.3%) of tokens is charged as swap fees to reward liquidity providers for their contribution to the liquidity.

Despite the huge advantages offered by DEXs, they also introduce novel challenges and vulnerabilities. A notable concern is Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) [3], a phenomenon that underscores the potential for block builders (e.g., miners, validators) to exploit their position by transaction insertion, deletion, and reordering for financial gain. As of September 15th, 2022, prior to the Ethereum Merge, the total MEV extracted from the Ethereum network amounted to $675.62 million [4], a figure that has since escalated to $1.81 billion as of February, 2024 [5]. In the context of AMMs, the sensitivity to the processing order of transactions exposes them to various forms of MEV exploitation, notably through front-running [3], where transactions are strategically placed ahead of others for profit, and sandwich attacks [6], which exploit the price impact of a victim trade by placing orders on both sides. In addition to bad user experience, these unexpected MEV behaviors have also caused issues including network congestion, high gas prices, and the risk of blockchain re-organization and consensus instability [3, 7].

To address these vulnerabilities, the novel exploration of batch auctions presents a promising DEX design. Instead of processing transactions individually, DEXs utilizing batch auctions such as SPEEDEX [8] aggregate orders over a short period and execute them at a set of uniform prices. Here, “uniform” means that all successfully executed transactions in the same swapping direction, say $\mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$, are under the same exchange rate $p_{\mathcal{X}}/p_{\mathcal{Y}}$. Then, the design’s key lies in setting prices for all involved tokens. This problem turns out to be closely related to the market equilibrium. By modeling tokens and transactions as goods and traders in a pure exchange market, respectively, a batch forms a linear market where each player’s utility function is linear, and the unique price vector under market equilibrium is exactly what batch auctions need [8]. This feature of uniform exchange rates eliminates the execution sequence in batch auctions and makes such DEXs resistant to front-running, sandwich attacks, and internal arbitrage. Thus, it is a general belief that batch auctions are fundamentally less vulnerable to MEV. However, as we are going to show, it still leaves enough non-trivial space for a block builder to attack batch transactions and obtain MEV.

As a summary, in this paper, we propose:
With DEXs becoming ever more prevalent and impactful, it is imperative to finally settle the computational complexity of the MEV optimization problems therein.

1.1 Our Model and Contributions

This paper studies the computation of optimal MEV in the two different types of DEXs, i.e., CFMMs and batch auctions. The analysis is under the same framework: both scenarios share the same format of transactions, the same strategy space, and the same utility function.

**The Model.** Specifically, we consider the exchange transactions among \( n \) tokens \( \{ \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_n \} \). In both scenarios, a transaction is trying to swap one type of token \( \mathcal{X} \) for another \( \mathcal{Y} \), represented in the format of \((\mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}, \delta\mathcal{X}, r)\) but denoted by \text{SWAP} and \text{BATCH}, respectively. In other words, each \text{SWAP} or \text{BATCH} transaction is composed of three components, i.e., the exchange direction \( \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y} \), the number of tokens willing to sell \( \delta\mathcal{X} \), and the threshold for the exchange rate \( r \) which means the user should receive at least \( \delta\mathcal{X} \cdot r \) amount of token \( \mathcal{Y} \) in return.

For a \text{SWAP} transaction, tokens are exchanged by a certain CFMM, which supports the exchange between two involved tokens. Without loss of generality, we explore the optimal MEV among the \text{SWAP} transactions between two tokens \( \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y} \in \{ \tau_1, \cdots, \tau_n \} \). Instead, in the batch auction scenario, all \text{BATCH} transactions involving multiple tokens can be executed in the same batch.

Regarding the strategy space and utility function, we follow the consensus of the community that MEV refers to the additional value that can be extracted from block production by including, excluding, and reordering transactions in a block. From now on, we use attacker/mediator interchangeably to refer to the role (e.g., block builders, miners) who can extract MEV. Given a set of \( m \) user transactions \( \{\text{SWAP}_i\}_{i \in [m]} \) or \( \{\text{BATCH}_i\}_{i \in [m]} \), the attacker is able to insert some transactions of the same type, select a subset of user transactions, and compute an order for these selected transactions, which together form an MEV strategy. For the batch auction scenario, the attacker can ignore the last reordering step because the order has no influence on the execution outcome of transactions.

Under a set of user transactions, once given an MEV strategy, the transactions’ outcomes as well as the attacker’s profits are determined. In this paper, the utility of a strategy is measured by the overall value of the attacker’s final token holdings. Note that the attacker’s profits are all from its own transactions. What utility functions of both scenarios (formally defined in Equation (1) and Equation (2)) do is to enumerate all attacker’s newly added transactions, and for each transaction, its utility is the value of tokens finally received minus the value of tokens it brought. Here, the value of a token is measured by its exogenous price, which represents the attacker’s self-belief – it may be the price in another DEX, another domain, or even the off-chain information (e.g., the price of tokens in a centralized exchange like Coinbase). Throughout this paper, we assume that the exogenous prices remain the same during the attack, which is around 12 seconds in Ethereum.

**Our Contributions.** In literature, many excellent works studied the same or similar MEV issue in AMMs, with a focus on empirical approaches [9, 7, 6, 3]. One recent work [10] studies a special case with no swap fees, where they succeed in presenting a polynomial time algorithm. Yet, no polynomial time algorithm for the general setting (where the fraction of swap is a constant larger than 0, say 0.3%) is known. This is not a coincidence, as our first main theorem (Theorem 1) shows that computing a strategy that obtains optimal MEV is, in fact, NP-hard.

In addition, we initial the study of MEV on batch swaps. It’s a widespread belief that batch auction is fundamentally less vulnerable to MEV since the outcome doesn’t depend on the order of transactions. However, we first observe the ability to insert and delete transactions is already
sufficient for the mediator to extract MEV (see Example 1 for a very concrete example)! By adopting the formulation of market equilibrium, such behavior is a novel market equilibrium manipulation, where a strategic player in the market has a very strong power – they can arbitrarily kick other participants out of the market and insert several fake identities. Although seemingly unreasonable, this is what could happen with block builders in the current blockchain system. This seeming unreasonableness exactly reflects the potential vulnerability of batch auctions, which, to the best of our knowledge, was not discussed before. One plausible reason is that while one can manipulate the batch auction in such a way, it is not clear how to manipulate since the outcome is not as easily predictive as that in AMMs. To this end, as our technical contributions, we discover many underlying combinatorial structures of the optimal attacks, the insights of which are going to be shown in the next subsection (Section 1.2).

As our second main contribution, we fully characterize the computational complexity of optimal MEV in batch auctions based on the structure of market: When the transactions in a batch form a Fisher market, an optimal attack can be computed in polynomial time (in fact, in almost linear-time!) (Theorem 2); When the transactions form a general Arrow-Debreu market, it is NP-hard to find such one (Theorem 3).

1.2 Overview of Insights in the Proofs

While optimizing MEV is computationally hard under both popular decentralized exchange scenarios (AMMs and Batch auctions), the routines towards these two theorems, in fact, provide many distinct insights, which we summarize next.

Let’s first get intuition on why the mediator could get some MEV in CFMMs and then explain why it is hard to obtain optimal MEV. Imagine that at the latest state of a CFMM pool, the exchange rate of two tokens is exactly the same as the ratio of their exogenous prices. Then, the mediator could execute an arbitrary user transaction, after which the exchange rate in the CFMM must deviate. Thus, this leaves a space for the mediator to back-run and obtain some profits. This is an ideal argument which, however, is not always true when there is a constant fraction of swap fees (in particular, \( f = 0.3\% \) of tokens is charged in common Uniswap pools). Specifically, when the volume of a user’s transaction is small, the profits obtained by back-running may not be able to beat the swap fees! Thus, we should adapt our intuition to try to back-run some large user transactions (i.e., transactions that want to swap a large amount of tokens), and there is where another constraint comes in: the slippage tolerance of these transactions.

Suppose that there is a transaction \( \text{Swap} \) that wants to swap a very large number of \( Y \) tokens for some \( X \) tokens, but with a non-trivial slippage tolerance requirement. The mediator would meet the following challenge to finish the best back-running: The mediator would like to find a set of users’ \( X \rightarrow Y \) transactions to reach a state at which the exchange rate of \( \text{Swap} \) exceeds but is closest to its slippage tolerance. Thus, the NP-hard problem used in the reduction is the Partition problem, which exactly reflects the hardness of achieving the goal above. We will provide more intuition about this argument in Section 3.3 before the formal proof of Theorem 1.

Batch auctions have a more sophisticated structure, as they bring the concept of equilibrium. Thus, one small change of the batch (insert, delete, or modify a transaction) may result in dramatically different outcomes for every transaction, making it difficult to analyze compared to AMMs. Nevertheless, we observe many underlying combinatorial structures for optimal attacks and highlight the following two points, which we found insightful:

- In general, the mediator only needs to insert transactions with the same type as user transac-
tions. Here, the “type” refers to which two tokens are involved in a transaction (Lemma 2). This implies there is always an optimal attack that preserves the market structure; in other words, the mediator is never necessary to complicate the market structure. In particular, when the mediator is attacking a set of user transactions that form a Fisher market, it suffices to consider attacks that remain a simple Fisher market, which is crucial to our efficient optimal algorithm for Fisher markets;

- In general, the directed graph of selected user transactions is acyclic (Lemma 3). The proof of this lemma follows a simple trick: If there was some cycle, then the mediator can locate one user transaction that can obtain profits, and replace it with their own transaction of exactly the same content. Despite being simple and intuitive, this actually illustrates a kind of front-running in batch auctions! Another consequence is that, under such kind of optimal attacks, there is essentially no “exchange” between two user transactions! The acyclic property also leads to identifying the hardness structure from the Feedback Arc Set problem, which we reduce to the MEV optimization problem for the general Arrow-Debreu market.

Finally, we briefly discuss the insights we can obtain from the two NP-hard problems we used. Even though NP-complete problems are all equivalent in terms of worst-case complexity, their corresponding optimization versions can behave dramatically differently in terms of approximation. In particular, the Partition problem has a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS), but the Feedback Arc Set problem only has constant approximation algorithm.

We conjecture that there is also a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for the MEV optimization problem in AMMs, while it remains NP-hard to have even a good approximation algorithm for that in batch auctions. In fact, even for the instances in the reduction (that are constructed from instances of the Feedback Arc Set problem), we couldn’t characterize the optimal MEV value, but only its very loose lower and upper bounds in terms of the solution of the Feedback Arc Set (see Lemma 6). Although by carefully chosen parameters, this is enough for us to finish the NP-hard reduction, we suspect the optimal MEV is generally produced by some non-linear programming with discrete decisions. If this conjecture is true, it also reflects the different levels of vulnerability of the two popular DEX systems.

1.3 Organization

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide more background on the MEV, its concrete behaviors in AMMs, and the design of batch auctions. In Section 3, we provide the formulation of the MEV optimization problem in AMMs and show its NP-hardness (Theorem 1). In Section 4, we first provide a light preliminary of market equilibrium and formulate batch auctions in this framework. We then argue that the current strategy is already sufficient for the block builder to extract MEV, and formulate the optimal MEV problem. Then, we provide two general lemmas that reveal combinatorial structures in optimal attacks. Finally, we prove our computational results regarding the Fisher market and the general Arrow-Debreu market. We discuss some future directions in Section 5.
2 Background and Related Work

2.1 Maximal Extractable Value

Although DEXs allow users to directly interact with on-chain smart contracts through a trading transaction when they want to exchange cryptocurrencies, such a transaction only represents the individual’s trading intent. The trading is truly executed when the transaction is included in a block on the canonical chain, which is managed by miners (in Proof-of-Work networks) or validators (in Proof-of-Stake networks). In the block-building process, they have the authority to decide which transactions are included in a block and in what order. It’s found that block builders are able to extract additional value from block production in excess of the standard block rewards and gas fees by manipulating the block content. This additional value was initially referred to as “miner extractable value” and modified to be “maximal extractable value” since the transition from proof-of-work to proof-of-stake via The Merge. In practice, besides block builders, a large portion of MEV is extracted by independent network participants called “searchers.” As the name suggests, they run complex algorithms to search profitable MEV opportunities and have bots to submit MEV-capture transactions automatically. The studies of MEV strategies naturally interest these roles, which are collectively referred to as the attacker or mediator in this paper.

2.2 MEV in AMMs

In the context of AMMs, the MEV phenomenon arises primarily due to the arbitrage opportunities caused by the price movement within a DEX or price discrepancy among DEXs. DEX arbitrage is the simplest and most well-known MEV opportunity. For a pair of tokens, if two DEXs are offering different exchange rates, someone can buy one token in the lower-priced DEX and sell it in the higher-priced DEX in a single transaction. Zhou et al. [7] translate the detection of DEXs arbitrage into a negative cycle detection problem, and Wang et al. [11] further analyze the profitability conditions and optimal trading strategies of cyclic arbitrages among multiple DEXs. After detecting such a profitable MEV opportunity, someone can submit its own transaction with the same arbitrage logic but a higher gas price to steal the profit by front-running. Torres et al. [12] perform a large-scale analysis of the real profits made by front-running attacks on Ethereum, providing evidence that front-running is highly lucrative. Qin et al. [9] provide a generalized transaction replay algorithm to clone and front-run a victim transaction without the need to understand the underlying transaction logic. Sandwich attack [6] is another common MEV behavior where a trader can “manually” create the arbitrage opportunity by exploiting a large order, the profit of which is quantified by Qin et al. [9]. Many other behaviors like back-run arbitrage [13] and cross-domain MEV [14] are also discussed in the literature.

The most related to us are the following papers. Bartoletti et al. [10] explore the same MEV optimization problem in AMMs but without swap fees, where the optimal attack is a multi-layer sandwich. [15] considers the practical scenario with swap fees and computes the optimal strategy to sandwich a single transaction. Our work fills this research gap by providing the computational hardness of attacking multiple transactions in AMMs with swap fees. Another related work is [16], which studies both with and without fees in a special AMM with greedy sequencing rule.

2.3 Batch Auctions

Batch auctions represent a novel evolution in DEX designs to address certain inefficiencies and MEV challenges inherent in AMMs. This paper mainly follows the mathematical model in SPEEDEX [8],
which maps the computation of batch prices to a well-studied equilibrium computation problem of pure exchange markets (details are introduced later in Section 4.1). In SPEEDEX, the batch execution is triggered when the core SPEEDEX engine receives a new block, followed by an algorithm query to compute clearing valuations and thus the execution outcomes. Similarly, CowSwap [17], which uses mixed-integer programming to clear offers in batches, also contains two steps: a centralized entity known as the “driver” aggregates all user orders; these orders are then relayed to specialized centralized actors, termed “solvers”, who bid to determine the settlement price (and over half [18] of non-stablecoin CowSwap orders are traded against private liquidity). As we will show later, the need to organize a batch through a mediator brings the risk of MEV. To the best our knowledge, we are the first to study MEV in batch auctions.

3 Optimal MEV in Constant Function Market Makers

In this section, we study the computation of optimal MEV in CFMMs. It is well known that the outcomes of transactions executed on CFMMs are sensitive to transaction-ordering attacks, which leaves space for a mediator (e.g., miner, validator) to extract profits. We start by formalizing the CFMM and the execution of transactions.

3.1 CFMMs Formalization and Execution of Transactions

We consider a CFMM $A$ for two types of tokens $\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y} \in \{\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n\}$, where we use $s = (x, y)$ as a state of $A$ that represents the current reserves of tokens $\mathcal{X}$ and $\mathcal{Y}$. The trading invariant can be modeled by a constant function on two variables $F(x, y)$. Throughout this paper, we will only consider the Swap-like transactions, and there is no deposit or redemption of liquidity, so sometimes we equivalently use $s = (x, y) \in F$ to represent a reserving point on the curve $F(\cdot, \cdot)$. We assume two natural properties about these constant functions: (1) for any two points $(x, y), (x', y') \in F$, we have $x > x' \iff y < y'$, namely, when the reserve of $\mathcal{X}$ increases, the reserve of $\mathcal{Y}$ decreases and vice versa; (2) $F(x, y)$ is differentiable and the marginal exchange rate $\frac{\partial F/\partial x}{\partial F/\partial y}$ is decreasing with respect to $x$. We note that most CFMMs satisfy these two properties, including Uniswap v2 and v3. Finally, we denote the fraction of the swap fee in AMM $A$ by $f \in [0, 1)$.

From the two properties above, we know that for any $x$, there is exactly one $y$ such that $(x, y) \in F$ and vice versa. So for simplicity of notations, we use $F_y(x)$ to denote that $y$ such that $(x, y) \in F$ and similarly define $F_x(y)$.

Suppose we are given a set of Swap transactions $\{	ext{Swap}^1, \ldots, \text{Swap}^m\}$ on AMM $A$, where each $\text{Swap}^i = (\delta_{\mathcal{X}}, r)$ or $\text{Swap}^i = (\delta_{\mathcal{Y}}, r)$. Without any ambiguity, we omit the swapping direction in this section and use the shortened notation $\text{Swap}^i(\delta_{\mathcal{X}}, r)$ to represent that the $i$-th transaction $\text{Swap}^i$ would like to sell $\delta_{\mathcal{X}}$ amount of token $\mathcal{X}$ to obtain at least $\delta_{\mathcal{X}} \cdot r$ amount of $\mathcal{Y}$, i.e., with $r$ as the lowest acceptable exchange rate. The meaning of $\text{Swap}^i(\delta_{\mathcal{Y}}, r)$ is analogous.

Pick an arbitrary permutation $\pi : [m] \to [m]$ as the execution order of all these $m$ transactions and let $s_0 = (x_0, y_0)$ be the initial state of $A$ before processing these transactions. The execution works as follows: Consider the $i$-th round and $\text{Swap}^\pi(i) = (\delta_{\mathcal{X}}, r)$. Let $\Delta := F_y(x_{i-1}) - F_y(x_{i-1} + (1 - f)\delta_{\mathcal{X}})$. If the condition $\Delta \geq \delta_{\mathcal{X}} \cdot r$ holds, then this swap is successfully executed and $s_i = (x_{i-1} + (1 - f)\delta_{\mathcal{X}}, F_y(x_{i-1} + (1 - f)\delta_{\mathcal{X}}));$ otherwise, the transaction fails and $s_i = s_{i-1}$. The case where $\text{Swap}^\pi(i) = (\delta_{\mathcal{Y}}, r)$ can be defined similarly.
3.2 MEV Optimization Problem

In this subsection, we formalize the mediator’s strategies and define its strategy space. Intuitively, a mediator can potentially delete some users’ transactions, insert its own transactions, and pick an arbitrary order of execution of the selected transactions.

**Definition 1 (Strategy Space).** Given a set of users’ transactions \( \{\text{SWAP}^i\}_{i \in [m]} \) and an initial state \( s_0 = (x_0, y_0) \), a mediator could create \( k \) its own transactions \( \{\text{SWAP}^i\}_{i \in [m+1:m+k]} \), select a subset of users’ transactions \( S \subseteq [m] \), and pick an execution order (a permutation) over all these transactions \( \pi : [S \cup [m+1 : m+k]] \rightarrow S \cup [m+1 : m+k] \).

**Definition 2 (Utility Function).** Mediator’s profit \( U(\{\text{SWAP}^i\}_{i \in [m+1:m+k]}, S, \pi) \) is defined as

\[
\sum_{i \in [S+k], \pi(i) \in [m+1:m+k]} \frac{x_{i-1} - x_i}{1 - f \cdot 1_{\{x_i > x_{i-1}\}}} \cdot p^*_x + \frac{y_{i-1} - y_i}{1 - f \cdot 1_{\{y_i > y_{i-1}\}}} \cdot p^*_y,
\]

where \( p^*_x \) and \( p^*_y \) are exogenous (or say, off-chain) prices of \( X \) and \( Y \) respectively.

This definition generalizes the idea of sandwich attack and can capture a wide range of order manipulation attacks. The goal of the mediator is to find a strategy \( \{\text{SWAP}^i\}_{i \in [m+1:m+k]}, S, \pi \) that maximizes its MEV (profits). Sometimes we also refer to such a strategy as an optimal strategy.

The following observation can help us simplify the notations when we study Swap transactions. Note that the lemma doesn’t hold for Batch transactions, which we are going to study in the next section.

**Observation 1 (No-Deleting in AMMs).** Given any set of users’ transactions \( \{\text{SWAP}^i\}_{i \in [m]} \) and an initial state \( s_0 = (x_0, y_0) \), it is without loss of generality to assume that the optimal strategy satisfies \( S = [m] \), i.e., the mediator will always select the full set of transactions.

**Proof.** The proof is easy. For mediator’s transactions, it can always create the transactions that it needs. For the users’ transactions, if the mediator didn’t select some users’ transactions in an optimal strategy, it can also equivalently put them at the very end of the sequence, and it will not affect the mediator’s profits.

Based on the observation above, we may omit the parameter \( S \) below for simplicity of notations.

3.3 Computational Hardness

This section systematically studies the optimal MEV on Swap transactions. Recall that in literature many excellent works studied the same or similar attack, with specific focus on empirical approaches [9, 7, 6, 3], or special cases (e.g., no swap fee [10] or attacking one user’s transaction [15]), but no polynomial time algorithm for the general setting is known. This is not a coincidence, as what we are going to show in this section.

In particular, as our main theorem in this section, we show that computing an optimal strategy for MEV is NP-hard when swap fee \( f > 0 \) is any constant (say \( f = 0.3\% \)), which is what happens in the real blockchain world. This indicates that if one wants to attract optimal MEV, it is necessary to design efficient heuristic or approximate algorithms, but not hope for a theoretically efficient optimal algorithm.
Figure 1: An illustration of the reduction in the proof of Theorem 1. The dark line means $x$-axis which represents the reserved amount of $X$ tokens. Light blue shadow means the “arbitrage-free” interval $[x_\ell, x_r]$, where any mediator’s transaction cannot obtain profits if the execution state is in this interval due to the trade fees. The orange blocks represent the set of $X \rightarrow Y$ users’ transactions; they satisfy that starting from the initial state, after executing all these transactions, the state remains in the arbitrage-free interval (so that the mediator can never use them to obtain profits). The purple block represents a large enough user’s $Y \rightarrow X$ transaction (which is the source where the mediator could obtain profits by back-running), and the purple dotted line represents the state that exactly satisfies its slippage tolerance. The left green part is where the mediator can back-run and obtain profits. The mediator’s goal is to find a subset of users’ $X \rightarrow Y$ transactions such that the state exceeds and is closest to the dotted purple line, so the green part is as large as possible. This construction can encode any instance of the Partition problem, formally shown in the proof of Theorem 1.

Theorem 1. Let $f \in (0,1)$ be any universal constant. It is NP-hard to solve the problem of finding an optimal strategy on SWAP transactions, even with the constant function $F(x, y) = xy$ (i.e., Uniswap v2).

Proof. We reduce the NP-hard Partition problem to our problem. Recall that an instance of the Partition problem contains $m$ positive integers $\{c_1, \ldots, c_m\}$ and asks if it can be partitioned into two subsets $S_1, S_2 \subseteq [m]$ with $S_1 \cap S_2 = \emptyset$ and $S_1 \cup S_2 = [m]$ such that the sum of numbers in $S_1$ equals that in $S_2$, i.e., $\sum_{i \in S_1} c_i = \sum_{i \in S_2} c_i = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in [m]} c_i$.

Suppose that we are given an arbitrary set of $m$ positive integers $\{c_1, \ldots, c_m\}$ such that the sum of all $c_i$’s is an even number (otherwise, the answer to the Partition problem is obviously “no”).

To start the reduction, we will construct a CFMM, a set of uses’ transactions $\{\text{Swap}^i\}$, and an initial state. Concretely, it suffices for us to use the product function $F(x, y) = xy$ (other CFMMs that satisfy our two properties defined in Section 2 will also work). Let the initial state $s_0 = (x_0, y_0)$ be such that $\frac{\partial F}{\partial x}(x_0) = \frac{p_x}{p_y}$ and $\frac{\partial F}{\partial y}(x_0) = \frac{p_y}{p_x}$. We will have $m+1$ users’ transactions; $m$ of them will be SWAP($X \rightarrow Y$), namely, they are trying to sell $X$ to obtain $Y$, and the other will be SWAP($Y \rightarrow X$).

Let $x_r$ be such that $\frac{\partial F_x(x_r)}{\partial x} = \frac{(1-f)p_x}{p_y}$ and $x_\ell$ be such that $\frac{\partial F_x(x_\ell)}{\partial x} = \frac{p_x}{(1-f)p_y}$. Let $K$ be the smallest positive integer such that $t/K \leq x_r - x_0$. Then we let $\{d_1, \ldots, d_m\} = \{c_1/K, \ldots, c_m/K\}$ and $t = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{i \in [m]} d_i$. Our problem is still to decide whether there exists $S_1 \subseteq [m]$ such that $\sum_{i \in S_1} d_i = t$. Obviously this doesn’t change the original problem, but makes it easier for us to finish the reduction.

Let $x^* = x_0 + t$. We first construct a huge user’s transaction $\text{Swap}^{m+1} = (Y \rightarrow X, \delta_y)$, where
\[ \delta_y = \left( y_0 - F_y(x^*) + L \right) / (1 - f) \] with a sufficiently large number \( L \). The exchange ratio threshold here is crucial: it is defined as
\[ r = \frac{x^* - F_x((1 - f)\delta_y + F_y(x^*))}{\delta_y}. \]

Intuitively, this means the transaction \( \text{Swap}^{m+1} \) can be successfully executed at some state \( s = (x, y) \) if and only if \( x \geq x^* \).

We then construct \( m \) users’ transactions \( \{\text{Swap}^i\}_{i \in [m]} \), where each \( \text{Swap}^i = (\mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}, \delta_\mathcal{X} = d_i/(1 - f)) \) (we’ll specify the thresholds of exchange ratios of these transactions later; they will also be crucial). Intuitively, this construction means if we only execute users’ transactions, then we can reach the state \( s^* = (x^*, F_y(x^*)) \) if and only if there exists \( S_1 \subseteq [m] \) such that \( \sum_{i \in S_1} d_i = t \), which corresponds to the answer to the given instance of the Partition problem.

Ideally, we would like the “if and only if” above also extends to the general case where we allow the mediator to insert some of its own transactions for the purpose of maximizing its MEV. This is where we need to be careful to construct the thresholds of exchange ratios of the users’ transactions.

For each transaction \( \text{Swap}^i \) for \( i \in [m] \), we set the threshold of exchange ratio to be
\[ \frac{F_y(x^* - d_i/(1 - f)) - F_y(x^*)}{d_i/(1 - f)}. \]

Intuitively, this means if a user’s transaction \( \text{Swap}^i \) is executed at state \( s = (x, y) \), then the \( \text{Swap}(\delta_\mathcal{X}) \) is successfully executed if and only if \( x \leq x^* - d_i/(1 - f) \). Equivalently, after successfully executing any user’s transaction, the state \( s = (x, y) \) satisfies \( x \leq x^* \).

This finishes the construction of an instance of the optimal MEV problem. Next, we show that if a mediator can find an optimal strategy, then it can solve the given Partition instance.

To this end, we define the mediator’s maximal MEV as follows (recall that \( x_\ell \) is such that \( \frac{\partial F_y(x_\ell)}{\partial x} = \frac{F_y'}{p_y} \)):
\[ \text{MMM} = (y_0 + L - F_y(x_\ell)) \cdot p_y - \frac{x_\ell - F_x(y_0 + L)}{1 - f} \cdot p_x. \]

The correctness of our reduction follows from the next lemma.

**Lemma 1.** There exists a strategy such that \( U(\{\text{Swap}^i\}_{i \in [m+2.m+1+k]}, \pi) \geq \text{MMM} \) if and only if there exists \( S_1 \) such that \( \sum_{i \in S_1} d_i = t \).

The reason that this lemma implies the correctness of the reduction is simply that if the mediator can find an optimal strategy, then it can easily compare the profit with \( \text{MMM} \) and solve the Partition problem. We postpone the proof to Appendix A.

## 4 Optimal MEV in Batch Auctions

Different from AMMs discussed above, batch auction is a trading mechanism that computes a uniform exchanging price and executes all transactions simultaneously. So the prices and outcome of the execution do not depend on the order of the transactions. Because of this, batch auctions are believed to be fundamentally less vulnerable to MEV compared to order-dependent mechanisms.

However, even though batch swaps are robust against front-running and sandwich attacks discussed above, we observe new strategy space for a mediator to obtain MEV by manipulating the
block content. In the rest of this section, we first introduce the concept of market equilibrium for efficiency of the batch price, which was also introduced in the design of SPEEDEX as the mathematical foundation [8]. Then we initial and formalize the study of MEV therein.

4.1 Market Equilibrium Formulation of Batch Auctions

Pure Exchange Market. A pure exchange market consists of \( n \) divisible goods, denoted by \( \{\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n\} \) and \( m \) traders, denoted by \( \{T_1, \ldots, T_m\} \). Every trader \( T_i \) initially owns some endowment \( w_i \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^n \), where \( w_{ij} \) represents the amount of \( \tau_j \) that \( T_i \) owns. Every trader \( i \) has its own utility function \( U_i : \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^n \to \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0} \), where \( U_i(x_i) \) means \( T_i \)'s utility if she gets a bundle of goods with amount \( x_{ij} \) for \( \tau_j \). In this paper, we focus on linear market, meaning that the utility function \( U_i = \sum_j u_{ij} x_{ij} \), where \( u_{ij} \geq 0 \) is the utility (or say preference) of trader \( i \) for a unit amount of goods \( \tau_j \). In economics, it has long been understood that prices are determined by the interplay of supply and demand where under a competitive price, supply precisely meets demand. Such an idea was captured by market equilibrium.

**Definition 3 (Market Equilibrium).** A price vector \( p \) along with an allocation \( x \) is a market equilibrium if the following conditions meet:

- **Market Clearance:** \( \sum_{i \in [m]} x_{ij} = \sum_{i \in [m]} w_{ij} \) for all \( j \in [n] \);
- **Budget Constraint:** \( \sum_{j \in [n]} x_{ij} p_j = \sum_{j \in [n]} w_{ij} p_j \) for all \( i \in [m] \); and
- **Individual Optimality:** \( x_i \in \text{OPT}_i(p) \), where \( \text{OPT}_i := \arg \max U_i(x_i) \) among all \( x_i \) that satisfies the budget constrain \( \sum_{j \in [n]} x_{ij} p_j \leq \sum_{j \in [n]} w_{ij} p_j \).

The existence of market equilibrium (sometimes called general equilibrium) under mild conditions was proved by Arrow and Debreu [19] and independently by McKenzie, which is regarded by many as the crown jewel of Mathematical Economics. Our world is much easier to navigate: We will show that the batch prices can be computed by a linear market equilibrium.

Consider a set of Batch transactions \( \{\text{Batch}^1, \ldots, \text{Batch}^m\} \) among tokens \( \{\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_n\} \), where each \( \text{Batch}^i = (\lambda^i, \delta^i, \lambda^i, \delta^i) \) would like to swap \( \delta^i \) amount of token \( \lambda^i \) for some token \( \delta^i \) and the exchange rate between \( \delta^i \) and \( \lambda^i \) should be at least \( r_i \) (i.e., the amount of received \( \delta^i \) should be no less than \( r_i \delta^i \)). Here, tokens naturally correspond to the goods in the market. Every transaction \( \text{Batch}^i \) can be viewed as a trader, where its endowment is \( w_{i,j} = \delta^i \) for \( \tau_j = \lambda^i \) and \( w_{i,j} = 0 \) otherwise. Its utility function is defined as \( U_i(x_i) = r_i \cdot x_{ij} + x_{ik} \) for \( \tau_j = \lambda^i \) and \( \tau_k = \delta^i \). Given any set of Batch transactions, we refer to the corresponding market as an Arrow-Debreu market if there is no more specified structure (this is mainly for comparison of the Fisher market that we will define below).

The market constructed above is a linear market in which every participant’s utility function is linear (in fact, it is even more succinct – only two goods have non-zero coefficients). The linear market enjoys many nice properties: First, previous work [20] implies that our batch auction structure always has a unique competitive price vector\(^1\), so that we do not face the equilibrium selection problem. In the distributed system where the Batch transactions are eventually processed by an arbitrary node, it releases us from the concern that certain nodes may strategically decide

\(^1\)The uniqueness is in terms of scaling, which means scaling the equilibrium price vector by a constant is also an equilibrium. It does not matter because what is really needed is the ratio of prices, which remains the same no matter how it is scaled.
the exchange rates. Second, it is polynomial-time computable, while for some other classic markets like Leontief or CES (stands for constant elasticity of substitution) functions, the computation of market equilibrium is computationally hard (PPAD-complete [21, 22]). Third, it is generally well understood from the works of past decades by researchers from economics, computer science, and operation research.

**Proposition 1** ([8]). By modeling the tokens \( \{\tau_j\}_{j \in [n]} \) and transactions \( \{\text{Batch}^i\}_{i \in [m]} \) as goods and traders, under the (unique) competitive price vector \( \mathbf{p} \) and arbitrary equilibrium allocation \( \mathbf{x} \), it satisfies

- **Internal arbitrage-free**: The prices are internal arbitrage-free (simply because we have a uniform price vector);
- **Soundness**: Any exchange (allocation) follows the price vector \( \mathbf{p} \) and meets its threshold requirement for the exchange ratio;
- **Completeness**: For any \( \text{Batch}^i \) with its threshold \( r_i \), \( \tau_j = \mathcal{X}^i \) and \( \tau_k = \mathcal{Y}^i \), if \( p_j/p_k > r_i \), then \( \text{Batch}^i \) sells all its \( \mathcal{X}^i \) and gets \( \delta_{\mathcal{X}^i} \cdot p_j/p_k \) amount of \( \mathcal{Y}^i \).

### 4.2 MEV Optimization Problem

The feature of uniform price in batch auctions makes it resistant to several DEX-related MEV behaviors like sandwich attacks and internal arbitrage. As a result, MEV seems impossible in batch auctions. We first note that this is not the case – we observe new strategic behavior, which is high-level in line with block content manipulation, but different from well-known MEV strategies like front-running or sandwich attack. The point is the execution result of a Batch transaction depends on which other transactions are included in the batch. Therefore, a strategic mediator can affect the outcome of exchanges by manipulating the batch contents (inserting and deleting transactions). The mediator still respects the market equilibrium outcomes, but that of the manipulated block content, during which it may gain profits. We give an example to provide more intuition.

**Example 1** (MEV in Batch Auctions). Consider the scenario with three tokens \( \{A, B, C\} \) and three user transactions \( \{\text{Batch}^i\}_{i \in \{1,3\}} \) where \( \text{Batch}^1 = (A \rightarrow B, 2, 0.5) \), \( \text{Batch}^2 = (B \rightarrow C, 1, 4) \), and \( \text{Batch}^3 = (C \rightarrow A, 4, 0.5) \). Assume the exogenous prices of tokens are all one, namely, \( p_A^* = p_B^* = p_C^* = 1 \). Given this batch of transactions, an honest mediator makes them exchange with each other (i.e., three users receive 1B, 4C, 2A, respectively) under the price equilibrium \( p_A = 0.5, p_B = 1, p_C = 0.25 \). Nevertheless, a strategic mediator can extract some additional value by re-organizing the batch. One method is to exclude \( \text{Batch}^2 \) and insert two attacking transactions \( \{\text{Batch}^4 = (B \rightarrow A, 1, 2), \text{Batch}^5 = (A \rightarrow C, 2, 2)\} \). By executing them in the batch \( \{\text{Batch}^i\}_{i \in \{1,3,4,5\}} \), the attacker receives 2A and 4C at the cost of 1B and 2A, obtaining a net benefit of 3 (recall that their exogenous prices are all 1). Another way is to directly replace the \( \text{Batch}^2 \) with the same attacking transaction \( \text{Batch}^{2'} = (B \rightarrow C, 1, 4) \). In this way, the attacker can also get a profit of 3.

Next, we give formal definitions of an attacker’s strategy space and utility function.

**Definition 4** (Strategy Space). Given a batch of user transactions \( \{\text{Batch}^i\}_{i \in [m]} \), a mediator could select a subset of all these transactions \( S \subseteq [m] \), create \( k \) its own Batch transactions \( \{\text{Batch}^i\}_{i \in [m+1:m+k]} \), and execute them in a same batch.
Without loss of generality, we assume that all mediator’s newly inserted transactions will be successfully executed; otherwise, removing failed ones from the set \( \{ \text{Batch}^i \}_{i \in [m+1:m+k]} \) makes no difference in results.

**Definition 5** (Utility Function). Mediator’s profit \( U(S, \{ \text{Batch}^i \}_{i \in [m+1:m+k]} ) \) is defined as

\[
\sum_{i \in [m+1:m+k]} -w_{ij} \cdot p_{j}^{*} + x_{it} \cdot p_{t}^{*},
\]

where \( \text{Batch}^i = (\tau_j \rightarrow \tau_t, \delta_{\tau_j} = w_{ij}, r_i) \), \( x \) is an allocation under equilibrium, and vector \( p^* \) represents the exogenous prices of tokens.

This section asks the following research question: Given a batch of user transactions, what’s the optimal strategy for a mediator to maximize its utility? Based on the structure of the given user transactions, we discuss this problem for the Fisher Market (Section 4.4) and the general Arrow-Debreu market (Section 4.5), respectively.

### 4.3 Combinatorial Structures in Optimal Attacks

In this section, we present two general lemmas that provide more intuition about how to tackle the MEV Optimization Problem in Batch auctions, and are very useful to simplify the analysis of optimal attacks. Before that, from a technical perspective, we recall the definition of the economy graph of a market, which was defined by Maxfield [23]. In our context, we will use the terminology of transactions, and define both the directed and undirected versions of economy graphs for our purpose.

**Definition 6** (Economy Graph). Given a set of transactions \( \{ \text{Batch}^i \}_{i \in [m]} \), we define a directed graph as follows. Each vertex corresponds to a token \( \tau_i \). For two tokens \( \tau_i \) and \( \tau_j \), we add a directed edge from \( \tau_i \) to \( \tau_j \) if there is a transaction \( \text{Batch}^k \) that swaps \( \tau_i \) for \( \tau_j \). We call this (directed) graph \( G \) the economy graph of \( \{ \text{Batch}^i \}_{i \in [m]} \).

The undirected economy graph \( H \) is defined as the same graph as the directed economy graph \( G \) but all edges are changed to undirected.

Intuitively, if there is an undirected edge between two tokens in \( H \), this means there is a user who is interested in these two tokens (would like to swap one token for the other).

Now we are ready to introduce the lemmas.

At a high level, the first lemma works on the side of inserting attacking transactions, stating that for an optimal attack, it is never necessary to make the undirected economy graph more complicated: it is sufficient to only insert transactions along edges of the undirected economy graph of initial users’ transactions \( \{ \text{Batch}^i \}_{i \in [m]} \). The second lemma concerns the side of selecting users’ transactions, showing that for an optimal attack, it suffices to select users’ transactions such that the directed economy graph of them is acyclic. These two lemmas bring some insights for the mediator to search for an optimal attack and are crucial for both our efficient algorithm design and NP-hard analysis in subsequent sections.

**Lemma 2.** Let \( H = (V, E) \) be the undirected economy graph of users’ transactions \( \{ \text{Batch}^i \}_{i \in [m]} \). There is an optimal attack \( (S, \{ \text{Batch}^i \}_{i \in [m+1:m+k]} ) \) such that the undirected economy graph \( H' = (V, E') \) of \( \{ \text{Batch}^i \}_{i \in [m+1:m+k]} \) satisfies \( E' \subseteq E \).
Proof. First, we assume that the original undirected economy graph $H = (V, E)$ is connected, otherwise the mediator can attack each connected component separately.

Given any general strategy $(S, \{\text{Batch}^i\}_{i \in [m+1:m+k]})$, we will construct a new strategy such that (1) the undirected economy graph of the attacking transactions in the new strategy is a subgraph of $H$; and at the same time (2) the mediator’s profit is the same as using $(S, \{\text{Batch}^i\}_{i \in [m+1:m+k]})$. By doing so, we can conclude this lemma. In particular, the selected users’ transactions are the same, so we focus on the attacking transactions next.

Consider any transaction $\text{Batch}^i = (\tau_j \rightarrow \tau_j', w_{ij}, r_i)$ for some $i \in [m+1 : m+k]$. Suppose that $\text{Batch}^i$ is successfully executed and $(j, j') \not\in E$. Note that if $\text{Batch}^i$ is not successfully executed, we can simply remove it from the strategy and everything will remain unchanged.

We will replace the transaction $\text{Batch}^i$ with a set of new transactions such that the edges that correspond to new transactions are a subset of $E$, and the mediator’s profit remains unchanged.

Since $H$ is connected, there is at least one simple path from $j$ to $j'$. Denote such path by $v_0, \ldots, v_t$, where $v_0 = j$ and $v_t = j'$. Let $p$ be the equilibrium price vector of $(S, \{\text{Batch}^i\}_{i \in [m+1:m+k]})$. We construct $t$ new transactions based on these information as follows. For every $\ell \in [t]$, we let the new transaction be $(\tau_{v_{\ell-1}} \rightarrow \tau_{v_{\ell}}, w_{ij} \cdot \frac{p_{\ell+1} - p_0}{p_0}, \frac{p_{\ell+1}}{p_{\ell+1}})$. Note that by construction all these new transactions are with respect to $E$, i.e., the edges that correspond to these newly constructed transactions are subset of $E$.

Now we show that the mediator’s profit remains unchanged. Note that mediator brings $w_{ij} \cdot \frac{p_{\ell+1} - p_0}{p_0}$ more $\tau_{v_{\ell-1}}$ tokens. But it is easy to verify that under new market equilibrium, each transaction $(\tau_{v_{\ell-1}} \rightarrow \tau_{v_{\ell}})$ will be successfully executed, and obtain $w_{ij} \cdot \frac{p_{\ell+1}}{p_0}$ many taken $\tau_i$. In total, the payoff of middle transactions will be canceled and the mediator will pay $w_{ij}$ many token $\tau_j$ and get $w_{ij} \cdot \frac{p_{\ell+1}}{p_0} = w_{ij} \cdot \frac{p_{j'}}{p_j}$ many token $\tau_j$, which is exactly the same as before.

This finishes the proof.

Lemma 3. There is an optimal attack $(S, \{\text{Batch}^i\}_{i \in [m+1:m+k]})$ such that the economy graph of selected users’ transactions $\{\text{Batch}^i\}_{i \in S}$ is acyclic.

Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that all transactions in this batch, namely, all transactions $\{\text{Batch}^i\}_{i \in S} \cup \{\text{Batch}^i\}_{i \in [m+1:m+k]}$ are successfully executed. Otherwise the mediator can remove all transactions that are not executed and the profit will be the same.

Suppose there is a directed cycle in the economy graph of selected users’ transactions. Without loss of generality, assume the cycle is $(\text{Batch}^1, \text{Batch}^2, \ldots, \text{Batch}^t)$ with a vertex sequence $(\tau_1, \tau_2, \ldots, \tau_t, \tau_1)$, where $t \in [2, m]$. Then, under equilibrium, there are only two cases.

- Case 1: the exchange rates of all transactions in the cycle are exactly the same as the ratio of corresponding tokens’ exogenous prices. In this case, replacing one of the user’s transactions with an attacking transaction of the same content has no impact on the equilibrium nor the mediator’s profit (as the profit of this replacement transaction is 0).

- Case 2: the exchange rates of transactions in the cycle are not all the same as the ratio of corresponding tokens’ exogenous prices. Note that $\prod_{j=1}^{t-1} \frac{p_{\tau_{j+1}}}{p_{\tau_{j}}} \cdot \frac{p_{\tau_{j+1}}}{p_{\tau_{j}}} = 1 = \prod_{j=1}^{t-1} \frac{p_{\tau_j}}{p_{\tau_{j+1}}} \cdot \frac{p_{\tau_{j+1}}}{p_{\tau_j}}$, where $\frac{p_{\tau_j}}{p_{\tau_{j+1}}}$ is the equilibrium exchange rate of the transaction swapping $\tau_j$ for $\tau_{j+1}$ and $\frac{p_{\tau_{j+1}}}{p_{\tau_j}}$ is the exogenous rate of these two tokens. In this case, at least one transaction’s equilibrium exchange rate is better than the exogenous one, say $\text{Batch}^j$ with the direction $\tau_j \rightarrow \tau_{j+1}$.
In other words, \( p_j / p_{j+1} > p^*_j / p^*_{j+1} \). Then, replacing this user’s transaction by an attacking transaction with the same content (namely, remove this user’s transaction from the batch and insert a mediator’s transaction with the same content) does not influence the equilibrium but increases the mediator’s utility.

In this way, for any attacking strategy with a directed cycle in the economy graph of selected user transactions, there is another strategy with no such cycle, such that the attacker receives no less profit than the previous one.

This finishes the proof. \( \square \)

### 4.4 Optimal MEV under Fisher Market

Our main result in this section is an efficient (in fact, almost linear-time) algorithm for the mediator to compute an optimal strategy for MEV under Fisher market structure, where trades occur between \( \tau_1 \) and \( \tau_j \) for all \( j \in [2 : n] \), with no trades taking place between \( \tau_j \) and \( \tau_{j'} \) for any \( j, j' \in [2 : n] \). An interpretation of this model is to view \( \tau_1 \) as USDC and every user’s transaction is trying to trade between other cryptocurrencies with USDC.

We first give two lemmas to prepare for our optimal MEV algorithm.

The first lemma says that the mediator can independently attack the user transactions that occur between \( \tau_1 \) and \( \tau_j \) for all \( j \in [2 : n] \).

**Lemma 4.** For every \( j \in [2 : n] \), let \( S_{1 \rightarrow j} \subseteq [m] \) be the indices of all users’ transactions that trade between \( \tau_1 \) and \( \tau_j \), and \( ATT_j \) be an optimal strategy to attack \( \{\text{Batch}^i\}_{i \in S_{1 \rightarrow j}} \). Then, \( \bigcup_{j \in [2 : n]} ATT_j \) is an optimal attack to \( \{\text{Batch}^i\}_{i \in [m]} \), where a union of two strategy is defined as the union of selected users’ transactions and the union of inserted attacking transactions respectively.

**Proof.** Let \( SS_{1 \rightarrow j} \) denote the set of successfully executed transactions swapping \( \tau_1 \) for \( \tau_j \) in the final batch, while \( SS_{j \rightarrow 1} \) denote the set of successfully executed transactions that bring token \( \tau_j \) and get \( \tau_1 \). Recall that under a market equilibrium, the market clearance condition holds. It implies that for any token \( \tau_j \) where \( j \in [2 : n] \), we have

\[
\sum_{\text{Batch}^i \in SS_{1 \rightarrow j}} x_{ij} = \sum_{\text{Batch}^i \in SS_{j \rightarrow 1}} w_{ij},
\]  

(3)

Let \( p_1 \) and \( p_j \) be the equilibrium prices of \( \tau_1 \) and \( \tau_j \), respectively. The requirement that everyone spends their entire profit under the equilibrium implies that

\[
\sum_{\text{Batch}^i \in SS_{1 \rightarrow j}} x_{ij} p_j = \sum_{\text{Batch}^i \in SS_{1 \rightarrow j}} w_{i1} p_1, \quad \sum_{\text{Batch}^i \in SS_{j \rightarrow 1}} x_{i1} p_1 = \sum_{\text{Batch}^i \in SS_{j \rightarrow 1}} w_{ij} p_j.
\]  

(4)

Combining Equation (3) and Equation (4), we have

\[
\sum_{\text{Batch}^i \in SS_{1 \rightarrow j}} w_{i1} = \sum_{\text{Batch}^i \in SS_{j \rightarrow 1}} x_{i1}.
\]  

(5)

It means that under equilibrium, the consumed token \( \tau_1 \) in the direction \( \tau_j \rightarrow \tau_1 \) are all from the transactions in the opposite direction; and vice versa for token \( \tau_j \) according to Equation (3).

In other words, each pair of tokens \((\tau_1, \tau_j)\) in the Fisher market can be viewed as a sub-market where transactions between them are self-sufficient under equilibrium. Thus, the mediator is able to independently attack the user transactions in each sub-market, namely, to consider selecting which user transactions and inserting which attacking transactions. \( \square \)
Now we are able to focus on each individual pair of tokens \((\tau_1, \tau_j)\) for every \(j \in [2 : n]\). The next lemma further simplifies the strategy space for optimal attacks therein.

**Lemma 5.** For each pair \((\tau_1, \tau_j)\) where \(j \in [2 : n]\), there is an optimal attack which inserts transactions in at most one direction, specifically. Furthermore, all transactions in this direction are from the mediator.

**Proof.** Without loss of generality, suppose the mediator inserts a transaction in each direction between \(\tau_1\) and \(\tau_j\) where \(j \in [2 : n]\), denoted by \(\text{BATCH}^{m+1} = (\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_j, \delta_{\tau_1} = w_{m+1,1}, r_{m+1} = p_1/p_j)\) and \(\text{BATCH}^{m+2} = (\tau_j \rightarrow \tau_1, \delta_{\tau_j} = w_{m+2,j}, r_{m+2} = p_j/p_1)\). If \(w_{m+1,1} \cdot p_1/p_j = w_{m+2,j}\) where \(p_1\) and \(p_j\) are the tokens’ equilibrium prices, \(\text{BATCH}^{m+1}\) and \(\text{BATCH}^{m+2}\) supply each other, bringing a utility of 0. Then, removing both transactions has no impact on the mediator’s utility. Otherwise, let

\[
\text{BATCH}^{m+3} = \begin{cases} 
(\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_j, \delta_{\tau_1} = w_{m+1,1} - w_{m+2,j} \cdot p_j/p_1, r_{m+3} = p_1/p_j), & w_{m+1,1} \cdot p_1/p_j > w_{m+2,j}; \\
(\tau_j \rightarrow \tau_1, \delta_{\tau_j} = w_{m+2,j} - w_{m+1,1} \cdot p_j/p_1, r_{m+3} = p_j/p_1), & w_{m+1,1} \cdot p_1/p_j < w_{m+2,j}.
\end{cases}
\]

(6)

Following the observation that \(\text{BATCH}^{m+1}\) and \(\text{BATCH}^{m+2}\) will be partially exchanged with each other, replacing them with \(\text{BATCH}^{m+3}\) has no impact on the batch execution and mediator’s utility. As a result, only one direction has the attack transaction. In fact, if \(1 \rightarrow j\) is the direction, then the prices must satisfy \(p_1/p_j \geq p_i^*/p_j^*\), and if \(j \rightarrow 1\) is the direction, then the prices must satisfy \(p_1/p_j \leq p_i^*/p_j^*\). Otherwise removing this attack transaction (and all user transactions between \(\tau_1\) and \(\tau_j\)) from the batch increases the mediator’s utility.

Then we show that all transaction in this direction are from the mediator. Under equilibrium, if there are user transactions successfully executed in this direction, replacing them with attacking transactions of the same content is still an equilibrium but brings more profit for the mediator. This concludes the proof. \(\square\)

Now we are ready to describe our main algorithm and state our main theorem.

**Theorem 2.** Given a set of users’ transactions \(\{\text{BATCH}_i\}_{i \in [m]}\) such that they form a Fisher market (i.e., trades occur exclusively between \(\tau_1\) and \(\tau_j\) for all \(j \in [2 : n]\), with no trades taking place between \(\tau_k\) and \(\tau_j\) for any \(k, j \in [2 : n]\)), Algorithm 1 finds a strategy that can obtain optimal MEV in time \(\tilde{O}(m)\), where the notation \(\tilde{O}(\cdot)\) hides polylogarithmic factors.

**Proof.** Algorithm 1 takes a batch of user transactions that forms a Fisher market and the exogenous prices as input and outputs a strategy to make the mediator obtain the optimal profits. It independently processes each pair \((\tau_1, \tau_j)\) for all \(j \in [2 : n]\). For each pair, it decides which user transactions to select and how to insert its own attacking transaction (including the direction, the amount of endowment, and the exchange rate threshold).

As the first step, by Lemma 4, it suffices for Algorithm 1 to work separately on pairs \(\tau_1\) and \(\tau_j\) for every \(j \in [2 : n]\). Fix a \(j \in [2 : n]\) below. By Lemma 5, it suffices to consider strategies that only insert attacking transactions in one direction. So Algorithm 1 tries both directions between \(\tau_1\) and \(\tau_j\) and pick the best one. Take the direction \(\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_j\) as an example. Again, by Lemma 5, we can throw away all users’ transactions that are for \(\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_j\) direction. Now the question reduces to the following: Given a set of users’ transactions \(\{\text{BATCH}_i\}_{i \in S_{\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_j}}\) such that every \(\text{BATCH}_i\) is in the direction \(\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_j\), what is the optimal way for the mediator to select a subset of users’ transactions and insert its own transactions in the opposite direction, i.e., the \(\tau_j \rightarrow \tau_1\) direction?
Suppose that the final exchange rate is ascending order \( \pi \) with respect to their exchange rate thresholds. Then the algorithm enumerates transactions \( \text{Batch}^1 \) such that \( r^i \leq p^i_1/p^*_j \) (otherwise the mediator will loss profit), thus we should delete (and ignore) users’ transactions \( \text{Batch}^i \) such that \( \pi > p^*_i/p^*_j \). Suppose that the final exchange rate is \( p^1_1/p^1_j = r \leq p^*_1/p^*_j \), then for each user’s transaction \( \text{Batch}^i \) such that \( r^i \leq r \), we can obtain profit \( \delta^i_{\tau_1} \cdot (p^*_i - r \cdot p^*_j) \geq 0 \). Thus we should include all users’ transactions \( \text{Batch}^i \) such that \( r^i \leq r \).

Now the correct way to attack them seems ready to come out: sort all user transactions in an ascending order \( \pi \) with respect to their exchange rate thresholds. Then the algorithm enumerates
each involved threshold and calculates the corresponding profit:

$$\text{Profit}(k) = \left( \sum_{k' \in [k]} \delta_{\tau_1}^{\sigma(k')} \right) \cdot (p^* - r^\pi(k) \cdot p^*_j),$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)$$

where $r^\pi(k)$ is exchange rate threshold of the $k$-th user transaction and $\delta_{\tau_1}^{\sigma(k')} \tau_1$ is the endowment of the $k'$-th transaction in the order $\pi$. This $\text{Profit}(k)$ is obtained by setting the threshold of the $k$-th transaction as the exchange rate in this direction, selecting all user transactions with thresholds no larger than that, and inserting an attacking transaction in the opposite direction to provide the exact amount of token $\tau_j$ they need, which is $r^\pi(k) \cdot \left( \sum_{k' \in [k]} \delta_{\tau_1}^{\sigma(k')} \right)$. Let $\text{Profit}_1$ and $k_1$ be the maximal profit and corresponding index for the direction $\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_j$. Symmetrically, the algorithm works on the direction $\tau_j \rightarrow \tau_1$ and obtains the $\text{Profit}_2$ and $k_2$. If both $\text{Profit}_1$ and $\text{Profit}_2$ are no larger than 0, we just ignore all user transactions between $\pi_1$ and $\pi_j$ and insert no transaction between them, as neither direction is profitable. Otherwise, choosing the strategy with the highest profit.

It is easy to verify that all transactions in the batch will be successfully executed. This finishes the proof.

\[\square\]

4.5 Optimal MEV under General Arrow-Debreu Market

In this section, we show the computational hardness of finding an optimal MEV strategy when the user transactions form a general Arrow-Debreu market.

**Theorem 3.** Given a set of users’ transactions \(\{\text{ BATCH}^i\}_{i \in [m]}\) such that they form a general Arrow-Debreu market, it is NP-hard to compute an optimal strategy.

**Proof.** We reduce the NP-hard Feedback Arc Set Problem to our MEV optimization problem. Recall that an instance of the feedback arc set problem contains a directed graph and asks to find an acyclic subgraph with a maximum number of edges.

Suppose we are given an arbitrary graph $G = (V, E)$ where $V$ is a set of $|V| = n$ vertices and $E$ is a set of $|E| = m$ directed edges (there are no multiple edges with the same source and target nodes). Note that we can decide if a graph is acyclic in polynomial time, and if the graph is acyclic, we can simply output $|E|$ as the answer of the given instance of the Feedback Arc Set Problem. Thus, without loss of generality, we assume that the graph is not acyclic, which implies the maximum acyclic subgraph of $G$ has $q < m$ edges.

Then, we construct the MEV optimization problem as follows. For each vertex $v_i \in V$, we construct a token $\tau_i$ and set its exogenous price $p^*_i$ as 1. For each edge $(i, j) \in E$, we construct a user transaction $\text{ BATCH} = (\tau_i \rightarrow \tau_j, m^m, \frac{1}{m^m})$. We refer the constructed instance to $\{\text{ BATCH}^{(i,j)}\}_{(i,j) \in E}$.

The correctness of this reduction follows from the following two lemmas.

**Lemma 6.** If the maximum acyclic subgraph of $G$ has $q$ edges, then the mediator’s optimal profit under the instance $\{\text{ BATCH}^{(i,j)}\}_{(i,j) \in E}$ lies in $[\left( m^m - m^{m-1} \right) \cdot q, m^m \cdot q]$.

**Proof.** Given Lemma 3, the upper bound proof is easy. Consider any mediator’s strategy $(S, \{\text{ BATCH}^i\}_{i \in [m+1:m+k]})$ such that the economy graph of $\{\text{ BATCH}^i\}_{i \in S}$ is acyclic, so we have
The requirement of acyclic graph is without loss of generality due to Lemma 3. For each token in the instance, its demand under a market equilibrium equals the supply. The mediator’s profit is the value of received tokens in the final allocation minus the value of its initial endowments, i.e., $1 \cdot m^m \cdot q$.

The lower bound proof is more involved and we focus on it next.

Assume that $G' = (V', E')$ is a directed acyclic subgraph of $G$ that has $q$ edges. We construct a strategy for the mediator that can obtain at least $(m^m - m^{m-1}) \cdot q$ profit. The construction is based on levels of nodes in $G'$, which we define next. We start with all nodes that have no incoming edges and label them as level 1; then we (virtually) remove the level-1 node(s) and all edges taking them as the source node; next, we label all nodes that have no incoming edges as level 2 and repeatedly process the remaining subgraph with an increasing level (i.e., level 3, 4, ...) until all nodes are labeled. In this way, all selected user transactions start from a token with a lower level and end at a token with a higher level.

Now we are able to describe the mediator’s strategy: First, the mediator selects all users’ transactions that correspond to edges in $E'$. Then for each selected user transaction $\text{Batch} = (\tau_i \rightarrow \tau_j, m^m, \frac{1}{m^m})$ in $G'$, the mediator inserts an attacking transaction $\text{Batch}'$ in its opposite direction, specifically, $\text{Batch}' = (\tau_j \rightarrow \tau_i, m^{m+i-l_j}, m^{l_j})$ where $i$ is the level of node $i$ (i.e., token $\tau_i$). The two steps derive an attacking strategy. Next, we prove that these selected user transactions and newly inserted attacking transactions are executed under equilibrium, and bring a profit no less than $(m^m - m^{m-1}) \cdot q$.

Let $p$ be a price vector of tokens in $G'$, where token $\tau_i$’s price $p_i = m^{l_i}$. It is easy to verify that $p$ is the price equilibrium where the unique allocation is as follows: Each selected user transaction $\text{Batch} = (\tau_i \rightarrow \tau_j, m^m, \frac{1}{m^m})$ is executed at the exchange rate $m^{l_j}$ which is larger than its requirement $\frac{1}{m^m}$, and receives $m^{m+l_j-l_i}$ amount of token $\tau_j$; Each attacking transaction in the opposite direction $\text{Batch}' = (\tau_j \rightarrow \tau_i, m^{m+l_j-l_i}, m^{l_i})$ receives $m^m$ amount of token $\tau_i$, bringing a profit of $m^m - m^{m+l_j-l_i} \geq m^m - m^{m-1}$. Combining that we insert $q$ attacking transactions in total, the mediator’s profit is at least by $(m^m - m^{m-1}) \cdot q$.

Lemma 7. If the mediator’s optimal profit is in $[(m^m - m^{m-1}) \cdot q, m^m \cdot q]$, then the number of edges in the maximum acyclic subgraph of $G$ is $q$.

Proof. The proof in fact follows from the disjointedness of $[(m^m - m^{m-1}) \cdot q, (m^m - 1) \cdot q]$ for different $q$. Specifically, we show the upper bound for $q - 1$ interval is strictly smaller than the lower bound of $q$ interval, which follows from the following simple calculation.

$$q < m \Rightarrow mq - q > mq - m \Rightarrow (m - 1)qm^{m-1} > m(q - 1)m^{m-1} \Rightarrow (m^m - m^{m-1}) \cdot q > m^m \cdot (q - 1).$$

Overall, deciding which interval the mediator’s optimal profit lies in is equivalent to finding the size of maximum acyclic subgraph of $G$. So finding an optimal strategy is as hard as solving the Feedback Arc Set Problem, which is NP-hard.

This finishes the proof.
5 Discussion and Open Problems

Approximation Algorithm for AMMs. The MEV optimization problem in fact subsumes the famous sandwich attack, which has attracted much attention in both academia and industry. However, as our main theorem in Section 3 showed, it is NP-hard to compute an optimal attack. On the one hand, this rules out the possibility of having exact efficient optimal algorithm. On the other hand, it naturally raises the question of studying the approximation algorithms. Note that the Partition problem that we reduce from is weakly NP-hard, which admits fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS). Although the MEV optimization problem has more structure than knapsack problem thus is seemingly harder than that (maybe closer to scheduling problems), we still think an efficient approximation algorithm with a good approximation guarantee exists. We leave this as the first concrete open problem.

Hardness of Approximation for Batch Auctions. As we discussed before, the proof steps used in our approach suggest that it may remain NP-hard even if we want a polynomial-time algorithm with good approximation guarantee. In particular, Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 together show that even if approximating the solution with a roughly additive $\frac{1}{m}$ fraction would imply $P = NP$. However, we conjecture that the stronger hardness of approximation should also hold. While both MEV optimization problems are NP-hard in the worst-case analysis, showing distinct results in terms of approximation would also give us new insights to understand their different levels of vulnerability.

Manipulating Market. We provided a polynomial-time algorithm to attack a set of transactions that form a Fisher market. It is also possible to study the same market equilibrium manipulation problem for the general linear markets (where the utility functions may have more than two non-zero coefficients). In particular, we are curious if our ideas could be extended to general linear Fisher markets to obtain a polynomial-time optimal-attack algorithm. If so, this could be a new point of view about the fundamental differences between Fisher markets and Arrow-Debreu markets.

Empirical MEV on Batch Auctions. The theoretical results of computational complexity are fundamental, but our interest of course extends to practical environments MEV, as decentralized exchanges are happening in blockchain everyday with incredible volumes. Even though optimal attack is generally an NP-hard problem, it is still promising to design heuristic algorithms to extract MEV; the possibilities of such novel MEV behaviors were not discussed by the community before. Technically speaking, our combinatorial structure still provides clear insights about how to narrow the strategy space for an attack to design strategies. However, to make the whole algorithm practical, there is still a large space for the design of robust and truly practical algorithms (with very fast running time). This is beyond the scope of the current work, but we are expecting emerging works related to MEV in batch auctions in the near future.

References


A Missing Proofs

We provide the proof of Lemma 1.

Proof of Lemma 1. One direction is relatively easy: If there exists $S_1$ such that $\sum_{i \in S_1} d_i = t$, then the mediator can obtain $\mathcal{M}$ profits. The strategy is as follows:

1. Execute users’ transactions $\text{SWAP}^i$ for all $i \in S_1$ (under arbitrary order);
2. Execute the user’s transaction $\text{SWAP}^{m+1}$;
(3) Execute one mediator’s transaction \( \text{Swap}(\mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}, \delta_x = (x_\ell - F_x(y_0 + L))/(1 - f), r = 0) \).

It is easy to verify that mediator’s profits equal \( \text{MMM} \).

The other direction is more involved. We will show that if there doesn’t exist \( S_1 \) such that \( \sum_{i \in S_1} d_i = t \), then for any mediator’s strategy, we have \( U(\{\text{Swap}^i\}_{i \in [m+2,m+1+k]}, \pi) < \text{MMM} \).

Fix arbitrary strategy \( \{\{\text{Swap}^i\}_{i \in [m+2,m+1+k]}\}; \pi \). Without loss of generality, we assume that all transactions \( \{\text{Swap}^i\}_{i \in [m^\prime]} \) for some \( m^\prime \in [m+1+k] \) are successfully executed (otherwise we can put these transactions at the back and mediator’s profits stay the same). We define a potential function of state \( \psi : \{s\}_{s \in F} \to \mathbb{R} \) as follows (recall that \( x^* = x_0 + t \)):

\[
\psi(x, y) = \begin{cases} 
(x - x_r) \cdot p_x^* + \frac{y - F_x(x_r)}{1 - f} \cdot p_y^*, & x > x_r; \\
\frac{x - x_f}{1 - f} \cdot p_x^* + (y - F_y(x_f)) \cdot p_y^*, & x < x_f; \\
0, & x \in [x_f, x_r]. 
\end{cases}
\]

Let \( s_i \) be the state that is after executing transaction \( \text{Swap}^i \). Let \( i^* \) be the index with \( \pi(i^*) = m + 1 \), i.e., the user’s transaction \( \text{Swap}^{m+1}(\mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{X}) \). We will inductively show that after executing \( i \)-th transaction, the profit of mediator

\[ U_i + \psi(s_i) \leq U_{i-1} + \psi(s_{i-1}) \]

for all \( i \in [i^* - 1] \). Note that at the beginning of \( s_0 \), we have \( U_0 = 0 \) and \( \psi(s_0) = 0 \). Thus after induction, we conclude that \( U_{i^* - 1} + \psi(s_{i^* - 1}) \leq 0 \). Note that \( \psi(s) \geq 0 \) for all \( s \in F \), so we can conclude that \( U_{i^* - 1} \leq 0 \). Now let’s move to the induction step and consider any \( i \in [i^* - 1] \).

**Case 1:** \( \text{Swap}^i \) is a user’s transaction. By the observation mentioned above, we know that \( \text{Swap}^i \) is successfully executed. Due to the thresholds of exchange ratios we constructed, we know that \( x_i \leq x^* \) (recall (\( \ast \)) above). Combining with \( x^* \leq x_r \), this means \( \psi(s_i) \leq \psi(s_{i-1}) \). Note also that executing a user’s transaction doesn’t affect mediators’ profit. So we have \( U_i = U_{i-1} \). To conclude, we have \( U_i + \psi(s_i) \leq U_{i-1} + \psi(s_{i-1}) \).

**Case 2:** \( \text{Swap}^i \) is a mediator’s transaction. In this case, \( U_i + \psi(s_i) \leq U_{i-1} + \psi(s_{i-1}) \) directly follows from the definition of \( \psi \) function.

Importantly, if all transactions \( \{\text{Swap}^{(1)}, \ldots, \text{Swap}^{(i^* - 1)}\} \) are users’ transactions, then we have \( x_0 \leq x_1 \leq x_2 \leq \cdots \leq x_{i^*-1} < x^* \). This follows from our condition from the very beginning that there doesn’t exist \( S_1 \subseteq [m] \) such that \( \sum_{i \in S_1} d_i = t \). If this is the case, then \( \text{Swap}^{(i^* - 1)} \) will not be able to be executed successfully due to (\( o \)) and mediator will not get any profit. Intuitively, \( \text{Swap}^{(i^*)} \) is the only transaction where mediator can extract some profits. So to make \( \text{Swap}^{(i^*)} \) successfully executed, it has to be the case \( x_{i^*-1} \geq x^* \), which means there are some mediator’s transaction in \( \{\text{Swap}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [i^* - 1]} \).

Let \( j \) be the first index where \( \text{Swap}^{(j)} \) is a mediator’s transaction, then we know \( x_0 \leq x_{j-1} < x^* \). We will show that \( U_j + \psi(s_j) < U_{j-1} + \psi(s_{j-1}) \) (this strict inequality is crucial and is essentially the reason why the mediator cannot obtain \( \text{MMM} \) amount of profits). If \( x_j \in [x_r, x_f] \), then we have \( \psi(s_j) = \psi(s_{j-1}) = 0 \) but \( U_j < U_{j-1} \) due to the swap fee. If \( x_j > x_r \), then we consider two phases for which \( x_{j-1} \to x_r \) and \( x_r \to x_j \). For the first phase, due to the same reason above, we have the \( \psi \) stays the same but \( U \) decreases. For the second phase, we have \( U + \psi \) doesn’t increase. The case \( x_j < x_f \) is similar.

So under the nontrivial case that \( \text{Swap}^{m+1} \) is successfully executed (i.e., \( x_{i^*-1} \geq x^* \)), we have \( U_{i^*-1} < 0 \). In the best case for the mediator, \( x_{i^*-1} = x^* \), \( \text{Swap}^{m+1} \) is successfully executed, and
the mediator inserts a transaction to extract $\mathbb{MMM}$ amount of profits. However, since $U_{i^* - 1}$ is already less than 0, we still have the amount of overall profits is strictly less than $\mathbb{MMM}$.

This finishes the proof. \qed